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Abstract: One of the first communists who received a portfolio in the 
Romanian Government was Teohari Georgescu. Working as a printer, as 
well as being a dedicated communist, he managed to become, in a few years, 
the Minister of Interior Affairs in Petru Groza’s Cabinet. In this paper, we 
were able to mark a few of the most important moments in Teohari 
Georgescu’s life and career, also revealing information on his purge, after 
being in charge of the Ministry of Interior Affairs for a few years.    
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Introduction 
 
One of the most important leaders of the Romanian Communist Party 
(R.C.P. – between 1948 and 1965 it was called the Romanian Workers’ Party 
– R.W.P.) was Teohari Georgescu, responsible for numerous actions at 
national level planned by the party or the Soviet Union and completed with 
the help of the institutions that he had in subordination. In this regard, T. 
Georgescu has distinguished himself from other members, even those from 
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the Central Committee (C.C.) of the Communist Party, concentrating the 
repression exerted throughout the country since the spring of 1945. He 
detached himself in the party by his typology, always proving himself loyal 
to the demands of the communists in Romania and beyond. 
 
Romanian or Jew? 
 
Teohari Georgescu was born in Chitila (near Bucharest) on January 
31, 1908, in the family of a grocer, being the third child out of a total of seven. 
There have been several discussions among the historians on the subject of 
his origins, in which his Jewish ancestry was highlighted and his supposed 
real name of (Samuel) Bureh Tescovici was discussed.1 That he was indeed 
Romanian was argued by Horia Nestorescu-Bălcești: besides the fact that his 
parents were Romanian, there is a cross at his tomb in the Sf. Vineri cemetery. 
Moreover, at an interrogation in 1952, T. Georgescu remembered an 
exchange of phrases between him and the head of the Security, Nicolae 
Turcu: “You are Romanian. What are you looking for in this movement 
where there are only strangers?”2 However, the style of his discourse, 
especially that about national minorities, would not place him among 
Romanians, as he was a politician who encouraged the granting of minority 
rights. He went to school only for a few years, finishing fourth grade at the 
                                                          
1 Dennis Deletant, Teroarea comunistă în România: Gheorghiu-Dej și statul polițienesc 
1948-1965, Iași, Editura Polirom, 2001, p. 34; George Manu, În spatele Cortinei de Fier. 
România sub ocupație rusească, Bucharest, Editura Mica Valahie, 2011, p. 161. 
2 Horia Nestorescu-Bălcești, “Teohari Georgescu 1908-1976”, in: Arhivele totalitarismului, 
Bucharest, no. 1, year III, 1995, p. 210. 
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“Sfinții Voievozi” school in Bucharest in 1920 and then completing only two 
high school years at “Saint Sava”.3 
In the booklet on his biography, we can discover some aspects of 
Georgescu's youth. Published in 1951, it contrasts his youth in a poor family 
with the society affected by the consequences of the First World War 
(poverty generated by the “imperialist and capitalist plunder”, according to 
communist proselytes)4. Hunger, “exploitation” and other problems caused 
by the “Anglo-American imperialists” plus the Great Socialist Revolution of 
October, all that took place when he was just 10 years old, seemed to serve 
not only as a stimulus to the Romanian workers' movement, but also to 
Georgescu's personality. The unsigned authors of the biography suggest that 
the public demonstrations held in Bucharest in 1917-1918 would have led 
young Teohari Georgescu to embrace the principle of “class struggle”.5 
 
The young revolutionary 
 
His political activity can be divided into three major periods, namely 
the years of illegality, corresponding to the interwar years, until the act of 23 
August 1944, then the period in which he worked with the Romanian 
Ministry of Interior Affairs (December 1944 - May 1952) and, finally, the 
period in which he remained a printer, not deprived of any function at the 
time, but stripped of any political decision-making power. Like other 
                                                          
3 Laurențiu Ungureanu, Radu Eremia, ”Teohari Georgescu, comunistul care a prescris 
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Communist leaders, after a difficult period of unlawfulness, he managed to 
enjoy his great prestige and increased power, before being eliminated from 
all his dignities. 
At the age of 15 he was hired at the “Cartea Românească” printing 
house as a manual picker6 for a fairly long period: 1923 - 1933. In his 
apprenticeship, he learned to organize the pages of newspapers like 
“Universul” and the “Official Monitor”.7 
Regarding his political orientation or preferences,8 we know that his 
interest in the communist movement led him to read ideological texts in 
secret and later to participate in Communist Party meetings. In 1927, during 
a protest, he entered as a member of the strike committee of the publishing 
house; following his political principles, in the same year he became a 
communist agitator.9 In the next two years, this activity was somewhat 
professional, enrolling in the workers’ syndicate of the Guntenberg printing 
house10, but also the national Siguranța (the state secret service). 
T. Georgescu made his first political step in 1929 by joining the 
Romanian Communist Party (functioning illegally at the time).11 Regarding 
his adherence to the R.C.P., the sources offer two variants: 1929 and 1933. 
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8 ***, Teohari Georgescu, Kiadja a Román Munkáspárt, 1951, pp. 10-11.  
9 Stelian Tănase, Clienții lu´ tanti Varvara..., p. 459. 
10 Dennis Deletant, op. cit., p. 34. 
11 Ghiță Ionescu, Comunismul în România, Bucharest, Editura Litera, 1994, p. 391; Horia 
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T. Georgescu, during the interrogations he underwent after his purge, 
mentions his entry into the party in the spring of 1933 at the suggestion of 
Avram Zighelboim and with the support Nicolae Goldberger. But his 
political acts led him to several prison sentences, as he was considered an 
“illegitimate communist”. During the same period (1929 - 1930), he attended 
military training at a military school in Oradea.12 His hatred for the “opulent 
businessmen” was the main reason for joining the Communist movement13, 
as well as getting involved in illegal political activity during the 1930s. 
In this sense, in 1933, at a time when he was also a member of the 
Local Commission of Syndicates in Bucharest, respectively of the General 
Council of Unitary Syndicates of Romania,14 we find him spreading 
communist propaganda flyers in the capital, which is why he was arrested 
and kept for two months at Văcăreşti prison, then released for lack of 
evidence.15 Actually, this was the beginning of a series of arrests. Only a few 
months later, in June 1934, he was arrested again for communist activity and 
jailed at Jilava, with Ștefan Mladin (the head of the team that arrested Ion 
Antonescu at the Royal Palace on the night of August 22 to August 23, 1944), 
Constantin Pârvulescu and Vasile Vâlcu,16 but, once more, only for a short 
time, being released on bail. 
One year later, he was imprisoned again, this time at Ploieşti prison, 
because he did not appear at the trial17 or because of compromising 
                                                          
12 Horia Nestorescu-Bălcești, “Teohari Georgescu 1908-1976...”,  p. 211. 
13 Florica Dobre (coordinator), Membrii CC al PCR 1945-1989..., p. 287. 
14 Ibidem, p. 287 
15 Dennis Deletant, op. cit., p. 34. 
16 Stelian Tănase, Clienții lu´ tanti Varvara..., p. 459. 
17 Dennis Deletant, op. cit., p. 34.  
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statements made for the Siguranța.18 His short periods of detention would 
come to raise suspicions about working for the national secret service, this 
constituting one of the reasons why he was cleansed in 1952. However, his 
political activity continued, in 1937 becoming secretary of Bucharest’s Third 
Sector, in 1938 becoming a member of the Bucharest local PCdR committee, 
and, the next year, becoming a member and later (starting from 1941) 
secretary of CC of PCdR. In those years, his job was still in the printing 
house, at the “Adevărul” newspaper and at the National Printing Office.19 
Between 1936 and 1937 he worked in a clandestine printing house owned by 
the Communist Party, which functioned in a conspiratorial house in the 
capital.20 
 
Teohari Georgescu, the politician 
 
For him, the year 1940 was an important milestone, because it was 
the year when he became a member of the Party Secretariat and also when he 
received his training in Moscow. Together with Ștefan Foriș, he went in the 
USSR for several months to be trained by Georghi Dimitrov, secretary of the 
Comintern, in coding and decoding messages, namely clandestine work. He 
had to acquire a cipher to keep in touch with the Comintern, without Foriș's 
knowledge, his purpose being to coordinate the special operations of the 
PCdR, parallel with Foriș (who was dealing with political issues). 
                                                          
18 Stelian Tănase, Clienții lu´ tanti Varvara..., p. 459. 
19 Dennis Deletant, op. cit., p. 34. 
20 Horia Nestorescu-Bălcești, “Teohari Georgescu 1908 - 1976...”, p. 211. 
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But Foriș and Georgescu’s journey to Moscow must also be seen from 
the perspective of finding the right leader for the party, in the context of the 
dismantling of Great Romania in 1940 and the loss of a large number of 
adherents from Northern Transylvania and Bessarabia. As such, Foriș was 
appointed general secretary of the party, and Georgescu understood that he 
would be his successor. It is important to point out that at that moment he 
was not in friendly relations with Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and that the 
perspective of Teohari as the leader of the party will haunt Dej for many years 
after the war. Some sources, however, say that the proposal would have been 
rejected by T. Georgescu. 
At the end of 1940, when Foriș was still in Moscow, Georgescu 
returned to Romania (with the help of Dumitru Coliu - aka Dimitri Kolev)21 
and met with Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu, the future minister of justice, who was 
seeking at that time to join the R.C.P. The meeting between the two ended 
with a warning from Pătrășcanu that Georgescu's life was in danger and 
recommended that he should leave the country, relying on information that 
dangerous people from the Siguranță had sneaked at the top of the party.22 
During these years, in which he illegally served the R.C.P. and the 
Comintern, T. Georgescu had several conspiratorial names: Ionescu (1934-
1935), Andrei (1936-1937), Mihai (1940-1941) and Popov (during his stay 
in the USSR in 1940).23 General Ion Mihai Pacepa presented some data, 
quoted then by the historian Lavinia Betea, regarding the activity of 
                                                          
21 Stelian Tănase, Clienții lu´ tanti Varvara..., p. 460. 
22 Ibidem, p. 411. 
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Georgescu and Vasile Luca (Luca László), Ana Pauker and Emil Bodnăraș 
(Panteli Bodnarenko) within a so-called underground army sought by Stalin 
in every communist state, to guarantee the success of Sovietization. The 
Comintern, for which Georgescu worked, would have been in the service of 
the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Soviet Union (I.N.U.) at the request 
of the Kremlin leader.24 
However, in 1941, a few months after his return to the country, 
Teohari Georgescu was arrested from the conspiracy dwelling in Bucharest, 
now with Iosif Chişinevski, and received a ten-year prison sentence, switched 
to hard labor. He was detained in the prisons of Caransebeș, Văcăreşti and 
Târgu Jiu. At Caransebeș, he became a close friend to Gheorghe Gheorghiu-
Dej. He stayed there for a year, and in 1942 he was moved to Văcărești 
Prison, a place where he was able to continue to carry out the printing job in 
the typographic workshop. The last part of the sentence was also carried out 
in Caransebeş,25 and he refused to adhere to a general escape plan set up by 
Belu Zilber's group.26 
In 1944, according to some estimates, about 150 Communists and 
Soviet spies were imprisoned in Caransebeș. The party cell was led by T. 
Georgescu, who was seconded by E. Bodnăraș, the new leader of the party 
and who, in his adventurous spirit, wanted to escape from the penitentiary 
and flee to Yugoslavia.27 However, the conditions of detention were not 
harsh, and Georgescu would have enjoyed a semi-open regime, for the same 
                                                          
24 Lavinia Betea, Maurer și lumea de ieri, Cluj-Napoca, Editura Dacia, 2001, p. 128. 
25 Ibidem, p. 128. Also see: Dennis Deletant, op. cit., p. 28. 
26 Lavinia Betea, op. cit., p. 17. 
27 Stelian Tănase, Clienții lu´ tanti Varvara..., pp. 155 - 156. 
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year he was seen on the streets of the city, dressed in a suit and selling objects 
made in prison.28 At that time, both he and other important members of the 
party took note of Dej’s hypothesis that Foriș was a traitor, considered the 
author of several arrests among the communists.29 This will later cause 
Georgescu to act against Foriș. 
After the act of August 23, 1944 (when Romania joined The Allies), 
all Communists came out of prison, which for the R.C.P. meant the revival 
of its activity. Teohari Georgescu was released from the Caransebeş 
penitentiary with the support of Leontin Sălăjan30 and began his ascension to 
office. Some authors do not hesitate to link his political rise with the 
restoration of the clandestine typography of the Communists in Bucharest.31 
However, like the other representatives of the communist elite, he did not 
have any experience in the democratic institutions and no idea how they 
functioned. The R.C.P. leaders, including Georgescu, saw a society 
exclusively designed to fight the bourgeoisie. For them, the Romanian 
society was a totally foreign environment.32 
Quickly becoming an opponent of the political power installed after 
the removal of Marshal Antonescu from the head of the Government, 
Georgescu constantly criticized the executives led by Generals Sănătescu and 
Rădescu, in the second one even taking part. His stronger rapprochement 
                                                          
28 Ibidem, p. 156. 
29 Ibidem, p. 346. 
30 Marius Oprea, ”Cum a ajuns zețarul Teohari directorul tipografiei”, Dilema, no. 167, 
March 1996, p. 8. 
31 Victor Frunză, Istoria stalinismului în România, Buchsrest, Editura Humanitas, 1990, p. 
242. 
32 Stelian Tănase, Elite și societate. Guvernarea Gheorghiu-Dej 1948-1965, Bucharest, 
Editura Humanitas, 2006, pp. 46 - 47.  
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with the Gheorghiu-Dej – Vasile Luca – Ana Pauker group amounted to some 
support received from the party at the end of that year when, on November 
4th, he entered the governing structure of the Interior Ministry as a sub-
secretary of State for Administrative Affairs.33 The Interior Minister was 
Nicolae Penescu. 
 
In the Rădescu Cabinet 
 
As sub-secretary, T. Georgescu had his own contribution to the 
communists’ seizure of state power, by installing some of the party's loyalists 
in nine of the 16 prefectures in the country. His activity corresponded to the 
actions inside the party and the most significant frictions were those with the 
prime-minister, Gen. Rădescu. Georgescu attacked him in several ways, from 
different accusations made by him or the National Democratic Front, to 
violent protests such as the one at the end of February 1945. He ignored 
Rădescu’s request to abolish the communist militia, and, moreover, he acted 
to convince the prefects in the country not to listen to his orders. One of the 
communists’ attacks on the government was related to the failure of the 
agrarian reform.34 The communists’ most important desire was to gain as 
much power as possible in decisions regarding Romania’s actions during the 
war, but also in the administrative apparatus, a significant contribution being 
made by General Andrei I. Vîșinsky, Deputy Commissary of Foreign Affairs 
of the U.S.S.R., the man designated to impose upon King Michael I the 
                                                          
33 Florica Dobre (coordinator), Membrii CC al PCR 1945-1989..., p. 287. 
34 Dennis Deletant, op. cit., p. 57. 
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appointment of a far-left government. Keeping close ties with the head of the 
K.G.B. agency in Romania, General Fedicikin, Georgescu began to infiltrate 
the communists in the national secret service, Securitate, in the Gendarmerie 
and the Special Intelligence Service.35 
Teohari Georgescu served as Undersecretary of State until February 
28, 1945, accusing General Rădescu the next day of crimes against civilians 
following the bloody repression of the meeting held in front of the Royal 
Palace (where, in fact, the Communists opened fire, staging a police and 
security attack), also recommending to the authorities to bring him in front 
of the People’s Court.36 
 
As the Interior Minister 
 
By appointing Petru Groza as Prime Minister, on March 6, 1945, 
Teohari Georgescu became the Interior minister, holding office from that day 
until May 27, 1952. 
In January 1950, he, along with sixteen others, became a member of 
the Organizational Office, a section dealing with organizational work, party 
life, controlling the implementation of party directives on organizational 
issues, and choosing and redeploying cadres. T. Georgescu had a post in the 
Organizational Office, along with other members of the Secretary and 
Political Boureau: Gheorghe Apostol, Iosif Chișinevschi, Chivu Stoica, 
                                                          
35 Marius Oprea, ”Cum a ajuns zețarul Teohari directorul tipografiei”, Dilema, no. 167, 
March 1996, p. 8. 
36 Stelian Neagoe, Istoria politică a României între anii 1944-1947, Bucharest, Editura Noua 
Alternativă, 1996, p. 258. 
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Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Vasile Luca, Ana Pauker and others.37 From 17 
March 17 1950, he was also the vice-president of the Council of Ministers 
(the Government), along with Chivu Stoica and Iosif Chişinevski. 
As the Minister of Interior Affairs, T. Georgescu subordinated the 
entire police apparatus, all order and administration structures, so that from 
the time of his appointment in the head of the Ministry, the communists held 
the entire control of the central administration and the local administrations, 
allowing for the gross falsification of the 1946 parliamentary elections. 
Moreover, after the abolition of the kingdom and the proclamation of the 
Romanian People's Republic on December 30, 1947, the repressive system 
constituted after the Soviet model (in this case the General Directorate of 
People's Security) was also placed under his subordination. During his term 
in office, he remained faithful both to Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej, the head of state, 
and to the rest of the Central Committee: Vasile Luca (the Finance Minister), 
Ana Pauker (the Minister of Foreign Affairs) and so on. 
Having so much power in his hand, he committed regular abuses. At 
the end of his mandate, T. Georgescu was characterized in particularly tough 
terms for a man who had quasi-total control over a country for seven years: 
“...he entered the workers’ movement because he hated the overpowering 
patrons, determined to reach and outrun them. His intimate life, after 
achieving success, exceeded the turpitude of the patrons. He left his wife (...) 
and committed adultery, taking advantage of the wife of a subordinate (...). 
Teohari has never grasped the concept of mercy towards his neighbour. 
                                                          
37 Nicoleta Ionescu-Gură, Nomenclatura Comitetului Central al Partidului Muncitoresc 
Român, Bucharest, Editura Humanitas, 2006, p. 14. 
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Teohari understands theft, embezzlement, falsity and scam. He has always 
«walked» across the criminal code, he hated and lived opulently and 
shamelessly, understood and lived on the dark, criminal side of man. (...) The 
one named T.G. (...) is not a communist, but a cupid printer, he has printed 
subversive manifestations for unknown people, for money”.38 
Teohari Georgescu was responsible for the purge of two characters: 
Ştefan Foriş and Lucreţiu Pătrășcanu. In Foriș’s case, we are talking about 
Georgescu’s desire to eliminate competition,39 for he had been the leader of 
the party between 1940 and 1944, being eliminated by blackmail by Emil 
Bodnăraș. T. Georgescu, like his other colleagues, considered that his arrest 
in 1941 was due to Foriș, who would probably have pursued the unruly 
retention of power.40 The way in which Foriș was eliminated arises from a 
later statement by Georgescu: “In the spring of 1946 (...) General Nicolschi 
came to me and asked me: what shall we do with Foriș? He has been kept in 
this state for a long time already. (...) A few days later, I went to the party's 
general secretary and asked, “What shall we do with Foriș, we have been 
keeping him for a long time now, should we suppress him?” As for my 
proposal, Gheorghiu told me he agreed to suppress him. After that, I searched 
for Vasile Luca and Ana Pauker (...). I asked them, what do we do with Foriș? 
- in the sense of suppressing him. They both agreed.”41 
                                                          
38 Stelian Tănase, Clienții lu´ tanti Varvara..., p. 461. 
39 Vladimir Tismăneanu, Arheologia terorii, Bucharest, Editura Eminescu, 1992, pp. 97 - 99. 
40 Ibidem, pp. 372 - 373. 
41 Marius Oprea, Bastionul cruzimii (o istorie a Securității 1948-1964), Iași, Editura Polirom, 
2008, p. 208. 
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Pătrăşcanu, the Minister of Justice and promoter of Stalinist cleansing 
in Romania, had placed into the minds of the R.C.P. leaders the idea of 
belonging to a possible Romanian communism, after which he was accused 
of bourgeois chauvinism and nationalism. Pătrășcanu’s purge appeared in the 
context of the lack of a unitary leadership of the party, on the leaders 
permanently planning a substitution by competition to “nationalize” the 
R.C.P. 
The first to attack Pătrășcanu directly and openly was T. Georgescu 
in February 1948 at the First Congress of the Romanian Workers’ Party 
(R.W.P.), bringing into discussion some of his thoughts on the disputes 
between Romanians and Hungarians in Transylvania.42 He denounced 
Pătrășcanu as “an exponent of the bourgeois ideology”, because he 
“underestimated the enemy's force (...) probably helped by the Western 
imperialist powers”.43 At the same time, he stigmatized him for being a 
coward and a traitor, accusing him of protecting former war criminals, 
allowing even the fleeing of capitalists from the country.44 Georgescu, 
although initially opposed to Pătrășcanu’s investigation,45 stood at the head 
of his investigative commission, together with Iosif Rangheţ (party secretary 
responsible for cadres) and Alexandru Drăghici (Deputy Chief of the Political 
and Administrative Section). Interestingly, at the time of his indictment, T. 
                                                          
42 Comisia Prezidențială pentru Analiza Dictaturii Comuniste din România, Raport final, 
Bucharest, Editura Humanitas, 2006, pp. 70 – 71. 
43 Marius Oprea, Banalitatea răului. O istorie a Securității în documente 1949-1989, Iași, 
Editura Polirom, 2002, p. 27. 
44 Marius Oprea, Bastionul cruzimii…, p. 178. 
45 Dennis Deletant, op. cit., p. 144. 
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Georgescu reproached the slowness with which the investigation had taken 
place, insinuating he deliberately delayed the case.46  
From 1950, Georgescu became an exponent of the nomenklatura, a 
privileged communist, indulging in, at least immoral, if not illegal acts to 
satisfy his personal and professional desires, a propagator of Stalin's cult and 
Stalinism in general.47 
 
Removal from the Ministry and purge 
 
In the early 1950s, T. Georgescu reported in his personal diary that 
there were more problems within the R.W.P. and discussed possible future 
sanctions and eliminations from the party.48 Apparently, the Soviet 
counselors had a significant role in the process of his and other colleagues’ 
purge from the Central Committee. The head of the Soviet advisers in 
Romania, A. M. Saharovski, sent, in early 1952, a series of negative reports 
on the work of the Luca-Pauker-Gerogescu group, blamed for putting 
obstacles before Dej.49 
Officially, the main reason behind the purge of the Luca-Pauker-
Georgescu group was the reluctance of the Minister of Finance (V. Luca) to 
implement monetary reform.50 But a more convincing reason is the 
                                                          
46 Ibidem, p. 145. 
47Stelian Tănase, Elite și societate. Guvernarea Gheorghiu-Dej…, pp. 133 - 136, 204 - 205. 
48 Gheorghe Onișoru, „Arestarea și anchetarea lui Teohari Georgescu”, in: Analele Sighet 7: 
Anii 1949-1953: mecanismele terorii, Fundația Academia Civică, 1999, pp. 435 - 436. 
49 Comisia Prezidențială pentru Analiza Dictaturii Comuniste din România, op. cit., p. 157.
  
50 Gheorghe Onișoru, Pecetea lui Stalin – cazul Vasile Luca, Târgoviște, Editura Cetatea de 
Scaun, 2014, p. 98. 
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elimination of competition, stemming from Gheorghiu-Dej’s obsession with 
preventing the appearance of any fractious groups in the party, namely the 
emergence of one or more competitors for the head of the party. Purification 
will prove to be nothing more than a continuation of the cleansing process in 
the party, whose victims were already Foriș and Pătrășcanu. Teohari 
Georgescu is placed by the historian Vladimir Tismăneanu in the factional 
group, respectively in Ana Pauker’s area of personal ambition in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. Dej also copied Stalin's obsession with the “imperialist-
Zionist conspiracy” where Pauker could easily be included.51 
The first problems began to appear on February 19, 1952, when a 
controversy over the Report on the Preparation and Implementation of the 
Money Reform appeared in the Political Bureau. The misunderstandings 
between Vasile Luca, supported by T. Georgescu and Miron Constantinescu, 
and also by Iosif Chişinevski and Alexandru Moghioroș, were linked to the 
drafting of the document by the Party Committee, which was responsible for 
the preparation of the reform.52 At another meeting of the Political Bureau, 
Emil Bodnăraș expressed the intention to set up a party committee, tasked 
with checking the work of the Ministry of Finance and the State Bank, in 
order to find the reasons for the failure of the monetary reform. It was when 
Al. Moghioroș proposed the dismissal of V. Luca as Finance Minister.53 
The involvement of the Soviets in the whole process was total. In 
April, a meeting of decision-makers, with a team composed of Gheorghe 
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Gheorghiu-Dej, Miron Constantinescu, Iosif Chişinevski and Gheorghe 
Apostol took place at Kremlin, where the purging problem was decided.54 
From that moment on, the path was open for the works of the Plenary of the 
Central Committee of the Romanian Workers’ Party, on May 26-27, 1952. 
Historian Dennis Deletant sees in the process of purification the 
beginning of the period of imposing dejist supremacy, masked, as Victor 
Funză completes, in the Stalinist principle of “exterminating the outsiders”.55 
It is not surprising that immediately after the purification of the three, 
Gheorghiu-Dej considered that “we must now prepare for Groza’s change. 
Let’s unify the functions of the state and the party in one hand”.56 So Dej had 
not forgotten the proposal of 1940 to appoint Teohari Georgescu as Foriș’s 
successor to the Communist Party leadership and wanted to definitively 
eliminate any competition. The Minister of Interior’s performance was 
considered “good” regarding the results of the purification efforts of the 
“people’s democratic” society he coordinated, as he himself talked about 
100,000 people removed. 
The situation of the “fractious group” had therefore been “resolved” 
for several months. Political scientist Stelian Tănase speaks of the Plenary of 
the Central Committee of the R.W.P., held on May 26-27, 1952, as “a 
obloquy ceremony, a political execution” carried out “by the rules of the 
political sect in which the party remained”, in which Vasile Luca, Ana Pauker 
and Teohari Georgescu were subjected to “a concentric attack, orchestrated 
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behind the scenes, being accused of all the known underground diseases”.57 
The main accusation was the “deviation to the right” (a sort of deviation from 
communist principles), very serious for a member of the Communist 
movement. The press release published after the plenary, concluded that it 
“unmasked and crushed the anti-partisan and anti-state group Ana Pauker - 
Vasile Luca”.58 The main reason for which Georgescu was removed was, 
officially, the fraternization with V. Luca. Georgescu had previously agreed 
with A. Pauker to defend Luca, so he was accused of having had a 
“compassionate attitude” toward Luca's “deviation”. They supposedly had 
been working for a long time, “weakening the spirit of leadership and 
endangering the party’s unity itself”. In fact, the report stated, Luca's position 
would have been the result of the permissive attitude of the two colleagues, 
Pauker and Georgescu.59 
Besides this major and general allegation, there would have been 
other, particular ones. Thus, Georgescu was accused that, during his years of 
running the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he did not “intransigently introduce, 
with revolutionary and communist conviction, the party’s line of destroying 
the counterrevolution”. In other words, he was accused of a small number of 
victims of repression. Another accusation was a settlement with a legionary 
leader, Nicolae Pătraşcu,60 who, in November 1944, returned in Romania 
from Germany leading a group of legionnaires, was arrested and then 
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investigated by the Interior Minister. Their agreement would have been 
advantageous for both sides, as it offered the Communists a small maneuver 
(shock troops) in case of problems.61 
T. Georgescu was also accused of the appointment of Șraer as 
Secretary General of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, although he was a 
former agent of the Siguranța, but also for the delay in the investigation of 
Pătrășcanu and Remus Kofler. Another accusation referred to not taking 
serious measures in eliminating the representatives of the old bourgeois 
landowners’ structures. Thus, some people such as General Rădescu, General 
Vişoianu, Grigore Niculescu-Buzeşti (former Foreign Minister in the 
Sănătescu Cabinet) remained free, although they should have been arrested, 
thus allowing them the possibility of organizing events to destabilize the 
regime in Romania. Ultimately, the head of the Interior Ministry was accused 
of failing to channel his efforts in the fight against the “Zionists” and the 
“Titoists”, also regarded as disruptive factors of the regime,62 and that, 
together with V. Luca and A. Pauker, he would have sabotaged the start of 
the cooperative process in agriculture.63 In other words, Teohari Georgescu 
became a “working class enemy”.64 
The consequence was his dismissal from all positions, namely 
minister of Internal Affairs, vice-president of the Council of Ministers, 
secretary of the Central Committee and member of the Political Bureau and 
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of the Organizational Office. The decree containing the dismissal of Teohari 
Georgescu from Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister 
of Internal Affairs was signed by C. I. Parhon and issued on May 27, 1952.65 
T. Georgescu expected such an evolution, because, in his diary, he wrote: 
“After the meeting held in March 13, I considered that everything was 
over”.66 The loss of all the functions held in the party and state apparatus 
meant sending him to “the bottom labour”, but only after a lengthy 
investigation. 
One month after his dismissal, he sent the Political Bureau of the C.C. 
of the R.W.P. a “self-critical” memorandum in which he tried to explain the 
facts and shortcomings of which he had been accused. In it, Georgescu 
acknowledged the error of supporting Luca in the sense of diminishing his 
guilt, as he didn’t understand who was responsible for the “right-wing 
deviation” of the Romanian finances. Thus, he considered that the “governing 
organisms” were guilty of the situation and not one person. He claimed he 
was not guilty of any “deviation from the line of the party”, for he had finally 
accepted both the accusations addressed to the Minister of Finance and his 
proposed dismissal. The accusations brought to him in the plenary held in 
May had surprised him even more so, since nothing had been brought to his 
attention beforehand: “I did not stand up against the party, I did not infringe 
upon the party's decisions, and that's why I did not expect to be accused and 
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sanctioned so severely, with no debate in the Political Bureau.”67 The former 
Interior Minister was also dissatisfied with the fact that the accusations were 
imposed on him in front of everyone, without being able to fight them in any 
way. The only offense he recognized was the closed-door discussion with 
Luca and Pauker of the content of the closed letter in March 1952, when the 
charges against the finance minister were made.68 
In another part of the memorandum, T. Georgescu listed some facts 
and shortcomings of which he was considered guilty. In essence, “the lack of 
combativeness against the class enemy” was due to the “drunkenness of 
success” (referring to the consequences of repressive measures) in the last 
years. His mistakes related to the peaceful attitude towards V. Luca during 
the meetings of the Political Bureau in February-March 1952, as well as his 
support for discussing the closed letter with Luca and Pauker, the mentioned 
“lack of combativeness against class enemy”, the maintenance of some 
“inadequate elements” in the Ministry for Internal Affairs, but also the fact 
that it did not “raise his ideological level”. When drawing the line, Georgescu 
saw the decision of the Political Bureau as correct, but he still demanded a 
new chance so that he could show his loyalty.69 In October, he addressed a 
letter to Dej in which he reminded him that during the May plenary, he had 
said he would rehabilitate himself, asking Dej to receive him in an audience, 
as was the case with Alexandru Moghioroș.70 The way the text is written 
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denotes a precarious state of mood, proof that even after half a year after the 
destitution, he had failed to overcome the storm of the moment. 
 
Arrest and interrogations 
 
Even so, on February 18, 1953, Teohari Georgescu was arrested. The 
stakeout made by the Securitate lasted several months, from June 1952. The 
former Minister of Interior Affairs had a follow-up file opened and his home 
was permanently supervised. An argument for the fact that Communist 
leaders did not even trust their colleagues is that their phones have been 
intercepted since 1948.71 According to some sources, the very day after his 
arrest, his wife (Maria Gh. Oprișescu - his third wife, the daughter of a priest 
from Oltenia) had thrown out the family gold from their home in Snagov 
Lake and destroyed a sum of money in foreign currency.72 In fact, both his 
wife and his two children, one only a few months old, had been used as a 
stimulating factor for obtaining statements from him.73 
Interrogations lasted for a total of three years, during which a number 
of serious deeds of the accused were revealed, both professional and 
personal. Just the day after the arrest, Major Lieutenant General Petre Socol 
accused him of “crimes against the Romanian people”. To begin with, 
Georgescu’s illegal activity was analyzed. In the interrogation report dated 
March 5, 1953,74 we can retain that his entry into the party, mentioned above, 
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would have been done with the support of Nicolae Goldberger (a member of 
the Political Bureau of R.C.P. in the 1930s and a future official of the 
Communist International movement) and that the workers’ demonstrations 
he attended were mostly anti-fascist. Regarding the advancement in political 
and administrative functions, we remember that Georgescu was promoted 
into the Secretariat of the C.C. of the R.C.P. in 1940 by Ștefan Foriș, the one 
whom he proposed to be eliminated six years later. It is also important how 
his interrogations were conducted by the Siguranța in the interwar period, 
when several methods were used to make him speak, from intimidation, to 
violence; one of the persons in charge of investigating him even was the chief 
of the secret service, Nicolae Turcu. 
At the end of the first stage of the investigation, in June 1953, 
Georgescu was accused of “provocative activity within the labor movement”, 
including his bonds to the Siguranța. At the same time, after his release from 
prison in August 1944, he had ran “counter-revolutionary actions”, in 
partnership with V. Luca and A. Pauker.75 Another report, dated September 
3, 1953, reveals some of T. Georgescu’s visit to Moscow, in 1940. Thus, the 
investigator received a description of the method of coding and decoding 
texts taught in Moscow and also received a list of people who knew 
Georgescu's conspiracy actions in addition to him. Although theoretically he 
didn’t know anything, Stefan Foriș had knowledge of the cipher in question, 
as well as Iosif Chişinevski. These methods of message encryption and 
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transmission have not been often used, both because of his arrest in 1941 and 
because they have not been forwarded to other people.76 
 
Georgescu’s personal life, “towed” by his professional one 
 
Teohari Georgescu’s intimate life turned out to be extremely agitated. 
He was married three times. Some problems that occurred during his job time 
were solved in exchange for intimate favors. During the interrogations in the 
summer of 1953, he recalled several women whom he helped in the previous 
years, with various services and for various reasons. But he had not shown 
that, in fact, for part of these supporting acts, he had asked them to have 
sexual relations.77 
Based on the interrogation minutes, Adrian Pop, historian, shows that 
during his years in the Interior Ministry, Georgescu received intimate favors 
from 30 women, from simple hosts of conspiracy houses in the years of 
illegality, singers, teachers, to Ministry civil servants, the wife of the former 
governor of the National Bank, Moşoiu, the wife of the Deputy Interior 
Minister, Stelian Tănăsescu, an official from the Billionaires Club, even 
some relatives.78 The nature of these favors was diverse: the release of 
legionary spouses from prison, hiring or re-employing them or their husbands 
in some places of work, especially in the Ministry, housing assignments, 
passports for Israel or the German Democratic Republic (Jewish and German 
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minorities that intended to leave Romania, but they did not have the financial 
or legal possibility or they were simply fugitives), cancellation of elimination 
decisions from the party or even money (currency) and gold. He usually had 
sex in his office with women coming in audience, or at home, taking 
advantage of the fact that they lived alone. We can interpret these customs 
not only as an exchange of services, but also as a weakness of T. Georgescu, 
who behaved in such a manner even if he couldn’t solve the problems 
invoked by these women or even for no particular reason. In one of the 
interrogation minutes, T. Georgescu spoke of a life of “deep immorality”, 
something he had hidden for years, this being incompatible with party life.79 
Besides, some of his relationships were not isolated, but had been constant 
for several years, especially in the case of the wives of former legionaries 
arrested several times (the Elena Popescu - Lascăr Popescu80 or Zizi 
Dâmboviceanu - Alexis Dâmboviceanu81 cases). 
In general, the former Interior minister had requested and approved, 
under various pretexts, the release of several former legionnaires, former 
Siguranță officers and police officers from prison. He may also have 
favorably intervened in releasing Nicolae Turcu, the former head of the 
Siguranță, in 1946.82 In fact, according to the statements, he would have 
suggested, as per his own interpretation, entering the structures of the 
Siguranță as an informant after his release from prison. Although we can 
infer from his narrative that he would never have accepted such a proposal, 
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in the 1956 report he appears to have recognized the destruction, in 1951, of 
the incriminating files of Turcu’s work from the Ploiești Siguranță HQ 
around 1935. Georgescu also asked Turcu not to talk to anyone about his 
bonds with the Siguranță. Although the former minister was proven to be an 
agent, no incriminating evidence of his work could be presented.83 
 
From remorse to rehabilitation 
 
Referring to his party colleagues with whom he had been cleansed, T. 
Georgescu reverted to older opinions in 1955 and, this time, revealed Ana 
Pauker’s anti-party activity, which succeeded, with Vasile Luca’s support, in 
removing some party members from their administrative posts and favoring 
others at the same time. It is the case of Constantin Pârvulescu, general 
secretary after Foriș (1944) and of Alexandru Drăghici, removed from his 
post as prime secretary of the party in Bucharest.84 
In February 1956, based on a charge of indictment, Securitate officers 
proposed the trial and conviction of Teohari Georgescu, but at Gheorghiu-
Dej’s intervention,85 this did not happen, so in March the former head of the 
Interior Ministry was released. The report drawn up by Alexandru Drăghici 
and Augustin Alexa says that, although the former minister intentionally 
made mistakes in his declarations, making incomplete and contradictory 
statements, it was considered that these actions, presented above, did not have 
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a counterrevolutionary character. In some cases there was no sufficient 
evidence for his imprisonment, so the authorities proposed to release him, 
with the retention of his acts for a subsequent investigation.86 
In the years during the investigation, some very acute views were 
expressed in the upper echelons of the party referring to the three communist 
leaders removed in 1952. Thus, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, in his report 
presented at the Second Congress of the R.W.P., accused the “fractional 
group deviators” of “politically injuring” the State by opposing the leaders of 
the party and that they would have tried to prevent the exercise of political 
power over the institutions in their fields of activity. Such an attitude would 
have created obstacles in the development of the “decisive branches of the 
economy” and, finally, in raising the standard of living. More specifically, 
the factionalists, implicitly Teohari Georgescu, were responsible for 
supporting the wealthy peasants (known as “chiaburime”) and preventing 
economical “bonds between the peasants and the townspeople”. “Crushing 
the deviation was a brilliant manifestation of the party's unwavering unity”, 
said Dej at the same Congress, confirming his tactic of intimidating and 
eliminating any form of opposition and fractional cores in the party87. 
After his return to his job as a printer, later director of the Romanian 
Book Printing House, Teohari Georgescu was able to take advantage of the 
changes in Romanian politics with the coming of Nicolae Ceaușescu to 
power. In the plenary session of the C.C. of the R.W.P. held between May 31 
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and June 2, 1965, the new Prime-Secretary advanced the idea of revising the 
political processes from the Dejist period. Ceaușescu said that “sanctions 
[were given] as an educational measure, and they should not impose on party 
members who were sanctioned or excluded for the rest of their lives, to the 
extent that, through their work, they have shown that they have learned their 
lesson and are determined to fight for implementing the party’s lineage”.88 
Thus, in later years, several communist activists, including Teohari 
Georgescu, were rehabilitated. According to a note dated April 14, 1968, the 
former minister of Internal Affairs was forgiven for eliminating Ștefan Foriș, 
but also by the issue of cooperating with the Siguranță in the years of 
illegality. In general, the document reiterates the conclusions of the 1956 
release, stating that the Securitate’s investigation had been abusively 
commenced before any decision of the Political Bureau was taken in this 
respect. 
Following the rehabilitation (1968), T. Georgescu also became an 
alternate member of the C.C. of the Communist Party between 1972 and 
1974. He died on January 30, 1976, in Bucharest. Central press did not 
mention anything about his death. Socialist historiography followed, in the 
1980s, the political idea of rehabilitating former political leaders. We identify 
such a case in 1988: “Between 1952 and 1954, numerous state officials and 
cadres from the Communist Party were sentenced to private custodial 
sentences, under the false accusation of undermining the national economy 
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and activity against the working class”.89 It is the case of Teohari Georgescu, 
but also of other Communist leaders such as Vasile Luca and Lucrețiu 
Pătrășcanu. 
Therefore, Teohari Georgescu remains an interesting character for the 
contemporary history of Romania, a controversial one, who has accumulated 
colossal power. He stepped up the political hierarchy relatively easy, 
knowing how to get in charge of his bosses, but fell with a much higher speed, 
proving that a man can easily be stripped of everything he has accumulated. 
Mild and perverse, he took advantage of any opportunity to win. He also had 
the great luck of being interrogated by the Securitate after Stalin's death. He 
died anonymously but still rehabilitated. 
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